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The Conservative Government has been keen to stimulate investment in small
businesses. In his November 1993 Budget, the Chancellor announced that the
Business Expansion Scheme (BES), due to expire at the end of 1993, was to be
replaced by the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and that a Consultative
Document on venture capital trusts (VCTs) would be published.
This Consultative Document was published in March 1994 and outlined a
PEP-like system for venture capital. An individual could put a sum of probably
£100,000 each year into a segregated fund which would purchase shares in
VCTs. The income and gains arising in the fund would be exempt from tax. A
VCT would be a quoted investment trust investing in small unquoted companies.
Eligibility of investee companies would be similar to BES/EIS relief and a
maximum investment of £1 million in any one company would be allowed, of
which at least 50 per cent would take the form of equity capital.
II. VENTURE CAPITAL
Venture capital is regarded as investing in unquoted business where the investor
takes the risk that he may lose his capital. Capital can be provided as
(i) debt capital,
(ii) equity capital, or
(iii) a combination of (i) and (ii).
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The holders of debt capital are entitled to a prior charge of the profits and assets
of the business, whilst the holders of equity capital are entitled to the residual
interest in the profits and assets of the business. An instrument such as a
convertible or profit-linked loan can combine the features of both debt and
equity capital.
Although equity capital is normally provided in the form of ordinary share
capital, debt capital can be provided in the form of either a loan or preference
share capital. Whilst a loan differs from share capital in being a liability of the
company, in risk terms there is little difference since if the company goes
bankrupt there will normally be no money to pay the unsecured creditors
anyway. Loan capital is, however, more tax efficient because the interest is
deductible in computing profits for corporation tax purposes. A preference
dividend is not deductible though the imputation system of tax reduces the
effective rate of corporation tax on profits paid out as dividend from 33 per cent
to 16.25 per cent. It will be noted that one of the effects of the reduction in the
rate of tax credit from 25 per cent to 20 per cent announced in the March 1993
Budget has been to increase the effective rate of tax on profits paid out in
dividend from 10.7 per cent to 16.25 per cent.
III. GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES
The Government's incentives on venture capital have been directed entirely at
equity capital. BES relief, and now EIS relief, are only available in respect of
ordinary share capital and the shares must not be entitled to any preferential right
to dividends or to assets on a winding-up. Similar restrictions apply to
reinvestment relief for capital gains under the Finance Act 1993. VCTs will be
allowed to invest in debt capital, but this will be restricted to 50 per cent or less
of the trust's assets.
The Government's incentives on venture capital have not been perceived as
being very successful in providing risk capital to unquoted companies.
Throughout its life, most BES investment has been in companies specially
promoted to take advantage of the relief and designed to exist merely for the
qualifying period of five years, and in the latter stages of BES, most of the
money went into guaranteed exit housing schemes where the investors took no
economic risk. Very little money has been raised by existing companies.
IV. UNSUITABILITY OF EQUITY CAPITAL
The underlying problem with the Government's schemes to encourage
investment in small businesses is that they have been targeted at equity which is
generally a most unsuitable form of capital for small unquoted companies. A
company or entrepreneur is primarily looking for cash to finance the start orFiscal Studies
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expansion of a business. Because the holders of equity are entitled to the residual
profits, the owners/promoters of a business are effectively selling an interest in
that business or prospective business by raising equity capital. As the promoters
of the business or development that requires the capital, they will be more
optimistic about the prospects and value of the business than outside investors
and they may well not perceive the price that the outside investors pay for their
equity as fair. Existing owners tend only to issue equity if they have no
alternative ways of raising capital or the issue of equity is part of a package
where debt is also provided.
By acquiring equity, the outside investors will become co-owners of the
business with the existing shareholders who will generally be the managers of
the company. Co-ownership inevitably creates potential conflicts of interest
which will concern both managers/existing shareholders and outside investors.
The outside investors will be concerned about how the business is run, what the
managers are taking out in remuneration, dividend policy etc. The managers will
be reluctant to cede voting powers to persons who know little about their
business. The smaller the business the more dependent it will be on a few
individuals, and the less easy it will be for outside investors to exert control. The
Government seeks to encourage employees to own shares, and it should be noted
that by encouraging outside investors to hold equity there is consequently less
equity available for employees.
A key factor for an investor in taking an equity stake in an unquoted company
is how the investment can ultimately be realised. There is little market for
minority shareholdings in unquoted companies and where they are sold the price
is generally very heavily discounted. Whilst flotation on the stock market is the
preferred method of allowing investors to realise their holdings, it is unlikely to
be economic these days to float a company much under a market capitalisation of
£50 million. The smaller the business, the less likely it will be to grow to a size
sufficiently large to be quoted on the stock market. Moreover, many managers do
not want the pressures of running a public company. A sale to a third party will
only be feasible if the managers want to sell their shares out also. Whilst a
purchase by the managers or the company itself is possible, this is not a third-
party sale and raises the issue of what is a fair price.
V. DEBT CAPITAL
Some form of debt capital which puts the interests of outside investors in priority
to the interests of the managers/existing investors is likely to be much more
attractive to both parties. It provides the investors with a quantified return which
arises before the managers' entitlement and leaves the managers with full control
over the business provided they deliver that return. Many companies would
borrow from banks, but the difficulty is that banks are reluctant to lend where
there is no security. Bankers generally require personal guarantees from theVenture Capital
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managers; as a result, if the business fails they could lose their homes and go
personally bankrupt. The terms on which banks can call in their loans can be
very onerous.
Entrepreneurs would be willing to pay high rates of interest for capital whose
terms are less restrictive and do not involve personal bankruptcy if the venture
fails. Many businesses actually only need small amounts of capital, often for
relatively short periods of time, and therefore high rates of interest are not
necessarily prohibitive. Whilst investors could lend at a straight rate of interest,
investors and managers should be able to negotiate terms appropriate to the
particular venture in question. These terms could, for example, include rolling up
interest for a period of time, or linking interest to profits. In many cases, the
capital might carry a guaranteed return plus some equity participation and
represent a hybrid between debt and equity. If the investors are entitled to a
guaranteed return they will only require a smaller percentage of the profits than
would be the case if the capital was entirely equity, and this will create less
tension between the investors and the managers.
If one looks at management buy-outs where most venture capital is currently
provided, investments comprise a mixture of equity and debt finance, and usually
by value debt finance is the largest element of the total investment. In the case of
larger transactions, it is possible to divide up the capital provided between equity
and one or more categories of debt. This is not so feasible in the case of smaller
businesses because there are considerable transactional costs in monitoring
unquoted investments and it will not normally be commercially sensible to have
more than one category of capital.
VI. TAX PROBLEM
Where debt capital is provided, the return comes in the form of income for tax
purposes and, moreover, any premium above the original issue price of the
investment, whether paid at redemption or otherwise, will be characterised as
income. In the case of venture capital there is a risk premium over and above the
return earned on totally secure funds at a bank or building society and the more
risky the investment the greater will be the premium. This premium compensates
the investor for the losses that he will inevitably suffer if he has a portfolio of
investments when a venture fails. Under longstanding tax principles, any loss on
his investment will be regarded as capital and cannot be offset against income.
The loss should (though not always) qualify as an allowable capital loss and can
be offset when realised against capital gains. Whilst some investors may have
capital gains and therefore can obtain tax relief, a portfolio that is geared
towards income is unlikely to have capital gains. Only a bank or finance house
which is regarded as a trader for tax purposes can offset losses against income. It
is very difficult for a person other than a bank to be regarded as a trader where
he is investing in securities intended to be held for the longer term.Fiscal Studies
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An investor who provides debt finance can therefore be taxed on a much
higher amount of income than he makes commercially. For example, an
individual lends at the rate of 20 per cent per annum 50 to one company and 50
to another company. On the first loan over five years, he earns interest of 50 and
receives back his capital of 50, but the other loan is a total write-off. The
investor will, in overall terms, have broken even before tax and made neither a
profit nor a loss, but for tax purposes, he will have earned income of 50 and will
have a tax liability of 20, which will mean that out of his original investment of
100 he will get back only 80. Because venture capital investments are risky, it
will make sense for an investor to diversify and invest in a portfolio of
investments. This inevitably increases the chances that the investor will be taxed
on a higher amount than his true economic income. Furthermore, the more risk
the investor is prepared to take in his choice of investment the worse his
problem. The position is no better if the investor invests through a collective
investment vehicle, such as an investment or unit trust. Such vehicles would
have to distribute their income in the form of interest or dividends,
notwithstanding making losses on the investments themselves.
If an individual makes a single investment and he gets paid his interest, but
the company subsequently goes bankrupt, he will be taxed on his high income,
notwithstanding later losing all his capital or, moreover, will still be taxed if at
the time the interest is received the company is in a doubtful financial position.
A bank can make provisions for losses against its income and the measure of its
income should be its economic profit.
Most individual investors have not looked to invest for income because the
rates of tax on income have traditionally been so high. Since income is now
taxed at below 50 per cent and at the same rate as capital gains, there is no
advantage for investors in looking for capital gains and investors should be
neutral between capital and income as long as the measure of that income is fair.
With the recent steep decline in interest rates, many investors are seeking to
maintain their income and if inflation rates remain low, debt investment should
become more appealing.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Rather than provide incentives to a particular form of finance which is not
appropriate for most small businesses, the Government would be better advised
to remove the tax difficulties that discourage debt finance from the non-bank
sector. There is no obvious reason why the provision of debt finance should be
restricted to banks and it would be desirable that individuals and collective
investment vehicles should be encouraged to lend to the small business sector.
High-risk lending is more appropriate for investors who are staking their own
money than for banks which are ultimately staking their depositors' money.Venture Capital
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•   Provision could simply be made that losses on venture capital investments
are offset against income. There is precedence for this in the form of relief
under Section 574 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 which allows
income tax relief for losses on ordinary shares in unquoted trading
companies.
•   This relief is not available in respect of debt capital and is only available
when the investment is realised. Any system of offset should allow relief for
provisions as this otherwise encourages investors to push unsuccessful
investments into bankruptcy. Provisioning, however, is inevitably subjective
and creates scope for disagreement between investors and the Inland
Revenue. The cost to the Exchequer might be reduced by restricting the
deductibility of losses or provisions to income from other unquoted
investments or investment income generally.
•   If the Government wanted positively to encourage venture capital it could
remove some of the subjectivity of provisioning by a system of allowances.
To reduce the cost to the Exchequer, allowances might be given over a
period of years with claw-back of the allowances when the investment is
sold. As part of the quid pro quo for allowing relief for losses, any gains on
the investment could be brought into charge to income tax.
•   The tax difficulty with venture capital finance arises because investors
receive a high rate of return for taking risk. An alternative approach would
be to allow investors to exclude their income for tax purposes and roll it
forward as a reserve against future losses. A reserve along these lines has
recently been introduced for Lloyds underwriters. In the case of venture
capital, the whole amount of income could be rolled forward or, less
generously, the income in excess of a normal rate of return, say 5 per cent.
•   An extension of this approach might be to allow investors to set up tax-
segregated funds along the lines of PEPs and what is proposed for VCTs.
Rather than exempt the income and gains of such funds altogether, which
perhaps would be too generous and would encourage avoidance, the income
and gains could be taxed when they are extracted from the fund.
•   The Government could confer exemption in return for a fee or a special tax.
Investments could be put into a tax-free fund if the investor paid a fee of,
say, 2 per cent to the Government. The level of the fee might be based on the
income tax that would be payable if the income was placed on deposit. At
current interest rates of around 5 per cent and a top income tax of 40 per
cent, a 2 per cent fee should more than compensate the Revenue for the loss
of the tax. The purchase of such exemption would mean that if the
investments were successful, investors would be better off, but if the
investments were not successful, investors would be worse off.
•   Since many investors would wish to invest through collective investment
vehicles which can spread risk and provide specialist management, attention
should be given to the tax position of such vehicles.Fiscal Studies
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VIII. OTHER ISSUES
•   Tax relief is usually available for interest on borrowings to finance an
investment in an unquoted company where the borrower has more than 5 per
cent of the share capital of the company. If investors are looking to invest for
income, there is no reason why investors should be denied tax relief for their
borrowing costs. To reduce the cost to the Exchequer, tax relief might be
restricted to income derived from unquoted investments in the same way that
interest relief on borrowings to acquire investment property is restricted to
the rents received.
•   Where interest payable by a company is to any extent linked to profits, the
interest is not deductible for corporation tax purposes and it is treated as a
dividend. This restriction does not apply where the lender is a bank or
company. In order not to discourage the linking of interest payments to
profits, it would be desirable to remove this restriction in respect of all loans.
•   Unquoted investments are more difficult and expensive to manage. It would
be appropriate that tax relief is given for such management expenses, as it is
currently available to companies.
IX. CONCLUSION
To a Conservative Government, tax incentives are more attractive than
government expenditure in stimulating economic development. However, tax
incentives, just as much as government subsidies, need to be carefully targeted
and run the risk of distorting economic activity. If taxpayers are being
encouraged by tax incentives to do something which they would not naturally
wish to do, larger tax benefits must be given to have any effect. The greater the
benefit on offer, the more it will encourage artificial schemes to claim the relief
without in substance doing what the Government intended should happen, and
this leads to loss of revenue.
In seeking to encourage investment in smaller businesses, the Government
has mistakenly targeted equity capital. Pure equity capital is not attractive either
to most small businesses or to investors. Debt capital is much more suitable and
achieves the desired purpose of providing cash to small businesses to finance
expansion. Rather than seeking to introduce tax incentives which of themselves
distort the tax system, the Government would be better advised to remove
distortions already present in the tax system. One significant distortion as
regards venture capital is that the tax system discourages high-risk lending by the
non-bank sector.